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Abstract 
 
This paper examines shareholder disapproval of CEO compensation as expressed through 
their advisory vote on executive compensation (say-on-pay) as required by Section 951 of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Using a sample of 
884 votes by S&P 500 firms in 2011 and 2012, I find that higher CEO salary, a weak link 
between pay and performance, and higher dilution from stock option grants are 
associated with lower say-on-pay approval. In addition, I find evidence that shareholders 
are sophisticated in their examination of CEO compensation by voting against excess 
compensation over what is deserved due to performance and other determining factors.  
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1. Introduction  
 
 Executive compensation has been a focal point for shareholder activism across the 
world in the last decade and has recently come under the legislative microscope in the 
United States. Following a 2006 SEC rule requiring increased compensation disclosure in 
“plain English”, the role of shareholders in compensation decisions has been growing. 
More recently, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was 
signed into law in 2010, and as required by Section 951, all companies with a public float 
of over $75 million must provide their shareholders with an advisory vote on executive 
compensation (hereafter referred to as say-on-pay). While the votes are non-binding, past 
research has suggested that boards react strongly to shareholder discontent and strive to 
avoid a negative vote (Ferri and Maber, 2011). As smaller firms begin their advisory 
votes this proxy season, this paper empirically examines which components of executive 
pay packages shareholders voted against in the first two full years of say-on-pay votes in 
the United States.  
 This study contributes to the literature on say-on-pay in several important ways. 
Most significantly, this paper and contemporaneous work by Kimbro and Xu (2013) are 
the first to examine the determinants of shareholder voting on say-on-pay in the United 
States. There is existing literature on similar say-on-pay practices across the world, 
specifically in the U.K. where a non-binding vote has been mandatory since 2002, but the 
literature is nonexistent in the U.S. Secondly, this study examines aspects of CEO 
compensation that have recently received extensive media coverage, such as golden 
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parachutes, but have been largely ignored by the literature. In addition, I test the 
proposition used by many say-on-pay opponents that shareholders vote sensationally 
against high levels of compensation and do not take a sophisticated approach to 
examining overall pay packages. The results of this paper are significant to corporate 
boards by providing useful information about which aspects of compensation packages 
are most concerning to shareholders. 
 This paper does not attempt to weigh in on the value creation proposition of say-
on-pay legislation. Previous studies have examined the market reaction to the 
introduction of the legislation in the United Kingdom and the United States with mixed 
results (Cai and Walking, 2011; and Larcker et al 2011). In addition, the literature has 
examined the market response to shareholder support in compensation proposals, but the 
literature on what shareholders actually dissent to in compensation packages is sparse in 
the United Kingdom and is nonexistent in the United States. Previous studies have 
examined the response to a high negative vote in the U.K. and have shown that the board 
reacts with more shareholder-friendly compensation in future years (Carter and Zamora, 
2009). Unfortunately, with only two years of say-on-pay votes in the United States, there 
is not enough data to perform a thorough analysis of the board’s reaction to say-on-pay 
votes here. To illustrate the timing issue, imagine the say-on-pay votes held at Company 
X’s 2011 Annual Meeting in regards to the 2010 compensation that is published in their 
2011 proxy statement. By the time the Annual Meeting is held in the middle of the fiscal 
year, much of the 2011 compensation has already been determined and a new 
compensation package cannot be fully implemented in the remainder of the year. As a 
result, it will be impossible to see the full response by the board without several years of 
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compensation data following the first vote. The only question this paper attempts to 
answer is what aspects of CEO compensation do shareholders disapprove of and vote 
against in say-on-pay votes.   
 There is extensive literature surrounding the concept of agency theory. In public 
corporations, the shareholders (principals) possess the ownership rights of the firm and 
are separate from the management of the business (agents). This separation creates a 
potential conflict between the interests of the principals and the agents. Theory suggests 
that through the use of performance-based bonuses, stock options, restricted shares, and 
other long-term compensation, the incentives of the CEO can be aligned with those of the 
shareholders to maximize firm value. In practice, however, managers often attempt to 
maximize their own utility and, in doing so, create agency costs. Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) find that the correlation between CEO wealth and shareholder wealth is small and 
has decreased significantly in the last 50 years. They hypothesize that political forces act 
to misalign the incentives between principals and agents. Corporate governance is 
designed to limit agency costs to the firm with the Board of Directors acting as a 
monitoring device for managers. Through the use of outside directors, it acts to control 
the self-interests of management. Nevertheless, as evidenced by recent option-backdating 
scandals, there are often conflicts of interest even within an independent board that limit 
its effectiveness in minimizing agency costs. As a result of these conflicts, shareholder 
votes on executive compensation have become an important supervisory instrument to 
oversee the decisions of the compensation committee.  
 This paper examines the 884 say-on-pay votes held by S&P 500 firms in the 2011 
and 2012 proxy seasons regarding the compensation packages for 2010 and 2011, 
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respectively. Although the votes can pertain to the compensation package for all of the 
Named Executive Officers (the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and the 
other three highest paid executives), CEO compensation has been the main focus of 
shareholder discontent. Therefore, this paper continues the trend of the previous literature 
by focusing exclusively on the compensation of the CEO. I find that shareholder 
disapproval is associated with CEOs that have higher salary, higher dilution from stock 
options, a poor link between pay and performance, and both a high level and high percent 
of excess total compensation. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that 
shareholders take a sophisticated approach to analyzing CEO compensation and are 
effectively exercising their right to have a voice in the compensation discussion.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the history of 
say-on-pay regulations throughout the world and the development of the rule in the 
United States. Then, in Section 3, I introduce the role of proxy advisory services followed 
by an examination of the literature in Section 4. This is followed by a description of my 
hypotheses and empirical methodology in Section 5. Section 6 describes my data which is 
followed by the results and conclusions in Sections 7 and 8.  
 
2. History of Say-on-Pay 
 There has been controversy over excess executive compensation for decades, but 
the first sign of any country adopting a compensation voting requirement was in 1999 
when the former U.K. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry indicated that such a rule 
was being discussed. In the next several years, before a vote was mandatory, many firms 
voluntarily put their compensation up to a shareholder vote. Shareholder support was 
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high; Hodgson (2009) notes that only 14 companies in the FTSE 100 received more than 
2.5% votes against and the highest level of shareholder opposition was only 10%. Despite 
the low dissent, in August 2002, the Director’s Remuneration Report (DRR) was 
introduced by the U.K. government requiring public boards of directors to publish a 
remuneration report annually and to submit it to a non-binding shareholder vote. 
 During the first full proxy season with mandatory remuneration voting, the first 
evidence of strong shareholder concern over pay surfaced when GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) 
received a failing vote of 50.72% against. Although the vote is non-binding, the result 
received worldwide press coverage and an immediate response from the board. In the 
case of GSK, shareholders objected to a high severance arrangement with CEO Jean-
Pierre Garnier and the board responded by requesting an independent review by its 
compensation consultants. In its annual report from the same year GSK outlined the steps 
it was taking to respond to shareholder discontent:  
During 2003 the [Compensation] Committee reviewed and developed the 
remuneration policy to align Executive remuneration with the interests of 
shareholders… The remuneration policy…was finalized after undertaking 
an extensive consultation process with shareholders and institutional 
bodies during the course of 2003. During the year the Chairman of 
GlaxoSmithKline and the Chairman of the Committee met shareholders, 
representing nearly half of GlaxoSmithKline’s share capital…as a result 
[the Committee] has instigated a major shift in the way GlaxoSmithKline 
sets the remuneration of its most senior executives. (GlaxoSmithKline, 
2003) 
6 
 
When the pay plan was finalized, the severance was drastically reduced and other 
components of the plan were better aligned with peer compensation. These actions 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the vote and significance it has on the firm’s practices 
(Conyon, 2010). In the decade since the DRR requirement in the U.K., the practice has 
spread throughout Europe and the Pacific with Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
and Switzerland all practicing some form of non-binding say-on-pay (Chasan, 2013).  
 While the current vote in the United States is non-binding, some have argued that 
the vote should have a binding effect on the board. Australia presents a case study on a 
binding vote requirement. The country has required an advisory vote since 2005, but in 
2011 adopted a binding “two-strike” rule that requires the board to stand for re-election 
within 90 days if 25% or more of shareholders vote against compensation plans two years 
in a row. This rule is one of the strictest and might be an effective way of targeting the 
responsible directors, but Ekwegh (2012) argues that in practice, the vote is effectively 
non-binding because shareholders are unlikely to vote against the report for the second 
year in a row due to the costly signaling effect of removing the board. He argues that 
binding remuneration votes do more harm than good. 
 Demand for shareholder approval of executive compensation in the United States 
has been steadily growing since the mid 2000’s with bills calling for mandatory votes 
appearing in Congress on several occasions. The most notable are Representative Barney 
Frank’s Protection Against Executive Compensation Abuse Act in 2005 and Senator 
Charles Schumer’s Shareholder Bill of Rights Act in 2009. Both of these acts called for a 
mandatory shareholder vote on executive compensation. While neither was enacted, they 
raised discussion on the issue and paved the way for future resolutions. During this time, 
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shareholders began voicing their concerns through proxy proposals. Under rule 14a-8 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, shareholders of a certain size
1
 have the right to 
publish a proposal in the firm’s annual proxy statement. Unless the company could 
convince the activist to withdraw the proposal or remove it for violating certain 
conditions, the proposal would be distributed to all shareholders and voted on at the 
company’s annual meeting. For years, the SEC disallowed proposals related to executive 
compensation because it concerned the company’s “ordinary business operations2,” but in 
October 1992 the SEC made broad changes to its proxy rules to allow more effective 
shareholder oversight and to reduce the separation of firm ownership and management. 
The new rules increased compensation reporting requirements and began allowing 
shareholder proposals under 14a-8 related to executive compensation. Binding votes were 
still a violation of the rules, so these proposals generally resulted in non-binding vote by 
shareholders.  The first proposal calling for an advisory vote on executive compensation 
appeared in 2006. Research from Georgeson shows that among S&P 1500 companies, 
there was an average of 57 proposals each year between 2007 and 2010. Support was low 
for these proposals, however, with only a few companies actually holding a say-on-pay 
vote. In 2008, Aflac was the first company to hold a vote, with ten more firms following 
suit the same year, some voluntarily and some in response to majority supported 
shareholder proposals.  
 In 2009, as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, all entities that 
received financial assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program were required to 
                                                          
1
 To be eligible, the shareholder must have continuously held at least $2,000 or 1% of the company’s shares 
for at least one year by the date the proposal is submitted 
2
 In violation of rule Rule 14a-8(i)(7) 
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hold an advisory shareholder vote to approve executive compensation. This meant that 
close to 400 companies, mostly banks and other financial institutions, were required to 
hold a say-on-pay vote in the coming proxy season. Despite the financial crisis and 
widespread shareholder concern, however, support for executive pay packages remained 
very high even for Wall Street’s biggest banks where public discontent was apparent with 
nationwide protest.  
 The first company to fail a say-on-pay vote in the U.S. was Motorola Inc. when it 
received support from only 46% of the votes cast in its 2010 proxy. Although a negative 
say-on-pay vote is not explicitly directed toward any particular aspect of a compensation 
plan, in the case of Motorola Inc. the shareholders were expressing concern with a large 
package for CEO Sanjay Jha in 2008 and his proposed stake in the company’s planned 
split into Motorola Mobility and Motorola Solutions. Two other companies, Occidental 
Petroleum and KeyCorp, failed their vote the same year, but most firms received 
resounding majority support, averaging over 87% in favor.  
 President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act in July 2010. In January 2011, the SEC voted to adopt Section 951 of the 
Act requiring all companies with a public float of over $75 million to provide their 
shareholders with an advisory vote on executive compensation at least once every three 
years beginning with any annual meeting taking place on or after January 21, 2011. The 
vote is pertains to all compensation data published in the company’s annual proxy 
statement. In addition, each company holding a say-on-pay vote is also required once 
every six years to hold a vote on the frequency of its say-on-pay votes: either every one, 
two, or three years.                           
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3. Role of Proxy Advisors 
 Proxy advisory services play a significant role in the outcome of say-on-pay 
votes. Institutions own the vast majority of publicly traded shares in the United States and 
they often do not have the resources or the interest to evaluate all matters put up to a 
shareholder vote. As a result, they often turn to proxy advisory firms, the two most 
prominent being Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass, Lewis & Co., for 
voting recommendations. This gives these firms significant influence on the result of all 
proxy votes. For example, in the 2012 proxy season, ISS recommended shareholders vote 
against 14% of the companies it evaluated. Shareholder support was 30% lower at 
companies that received a negative evaluation. The same research shows that on average, 
firms receiving a ‘for’ recommendation from ISS had a 94% approval from shareholders 
while firms receiving an ‘against’ recommendation had only 64% say-on-pay approval3.
 ISS follows a set of guidelines when evaluating compensation packages. ISS 
policy recommends voting against compensation packages where there is a misalignment 
between pay and performance, when the company maintains problematic pay practices, 
and/or when there is poor communication between the board and shareholders (ISS, 
2013). Problematic pay practices include options backdating, incentives tied to excessive 
risk-taking, and non-performance-based compensation components. Firms are evaluated 
on a case-by-case basis which means that during the peak of proxy season, ISS has 
several months to review and evaluate thousands of firms and provide voting 
recommendations to its clients.  
                                                          
3
 Data from Semler Brossy Consulting Group 2012 Say-on-pay Results: Year-End Report 
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 There is a lot of controversy surrounding the role of proxy advisory services 
because they operate as largely unregulated entities. Considering the amount of influence 
they possess, it is likely that they will fall under increasing scrutiny in the coming years. 
There is an apparent conflict of interest created by the relationships between proxy 
advisory services and certain investors. Proxy advisory firms claim to be acting in the 
best interest of all shareholders, but unpublished relationships with certain groups that 
would benefit unfairly from a recommendation one way or the other pose a conflict of 
interest and a risk to the rest of the firm’s clients. In addition, some proxy advisory 
services do not publish their voting guidelines, and the ones that do, like ISS, are vague 
and subjective. Many firms are dissatisfied with the large role proxy advisory services 
play in the voting process and are calling for the SEC to regulate these entities
4
.  
 While proxy advisor recommendations would be an interesting variable to 
examine, the data is not available for this study. Several interesting extensions would be 
to test for abnormal stock returns surrounding the release of a negative recommendation 
or a voting result inconsistent with the advisor’s recommendation.  
 
4. Literature Review  
There is extensive literature surrounding compensation related shareholder 
proposals in the U.S. Thomas and Martin (1999) examine 168 proposals received by 145 
different firms between 1993 and 1997 to determine characteristics of firms targeted for 
shareholder compensation proposals. They create a control group by matching each target 
firm with comparably sized firms in the same industry. They find a statistically 
                                                          
4
 See letter from FedEx to the SEC calling for increased regulation: http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-
10/s71410-157.pdf 
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significant difference between the CEO salary of target firms and control firms while the 
difference in other forms of compensation is not significantly different than zero. Target 
firms also significantly underperform the S&P 500 return over the three and five year 
periods prior to the voting year which is consistent with their hypothesis that 
underperforming firms are targeted.  
 Emitur, Ferri, and Muslu (2010) examine a sample of 1,341 activism related 
events (1,198 shareholder proposals and 143 vote-no campaigns
5
) related to executive 
compensation between 1997 and 2007 in an extension of the work done by Thomas and 
Martin. Using a similar technique of pairing each target firm with a control group, they 
find that firms with greater CEO pay, both cash and equity, are significantly more likely 
to be targeted by shareholders with a compensation related proxy proposal. Furthermore, 
they attempt to examine the “sophistication” and “sensationalism” used by activist 
shareholders in targeting firms by breaking down total CEO pay into predicted pay and 
residual pay. They find a significant coefficient on residual pay demonstrating that 
activists employ a sophisticated approach in selecting firms to target as well as a 
significant coefficient on predicted pay as an indicator of sensationalism. Their results 
indicate that activists generally target companies with high CEO pay and do not 
discriminate as to the breakdown of the compensation or the overall compensation 
philosophy of the firm.  
 In this paper, I add to the literature by examining a sample of mandatory votes 
and their outcomes rather than the probability of being targeted by a proposal. Emitur et 
                                                          
5
 Vote-no campaigns target specific board nominees and withhold votes in their election to express 
dissatisfaction with corporate governance. Ertimur et al. examine vote-no campaigns that specifically 
mention executive pay as a motivation.  
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al. (2010) and Thomas et al. (1999) only take into account the likelihood of being 
targeted and do not consider how the voting outcome is affected by the compensation 
package. In addition, they only examine several aspects of pay, specifically cash 
compensation and equity grants, while ignoring potential areas of shareholder discontent 
such as pay for performance link, potential dilution, and excess change of control 
payments. 
 A second avenue for shareholder participation in compensation decisions is in 
binding votes on management-sponsored stock-based compensation proposals. In an 
examination of 1,729 proposals between 1992 and 2003, Morgan, Poulsen, and Wolf 
(2006) find that dilutive plans with negative voting recommendations from a proxy 
advisor receive lower voting results. In addition, they find evidence that the ratio of total 
CEO compensation to firm assets is negatively correlated with voting outcomes on future 
stock-based compensation proposals.  
Say-on-pay votes differ in several significant ways from votes on equity-based 
compensation plan proposals. First, say-on-pay votes are in regards to the overall 
compensation published in the company’s proxy filings. This allows shareholders to vote 
against the overall philosophy of the compensation committee rather than a specific plan. 
Secondly, in contrast to the binding nature of votes on management sponsored equity 
compensation plans, say-on-pay votes are non-binding which allows shareholders to 
express their discontent freely without worrying about the possibility of direct strategic 
consequences.  
 Other studies of compensation related proposals examine the stock market 
reaction to management-sponsored proposals. Morgan and Poulsen (2001) examine a 
13 
 
sample from 1992 to 1995 and find that stock option proposals significantly increase 
shareholder wealth, especially when the plans exclusively target executives or top 
management. Martin and Thomas (2005) examine management-sponsored proposals for 
stock option plans in the 1998 proxy season. They note a dramatic increase in the use of 
large stock option grants leading to a possible shift in the market’s perception of dilutive 
plans. Consistent with their hypothesis that the market will react negatively to high levels 
of potential dilution, they find that executive-only proposals with higher dilution result in 
a significantly negative cumulative abnormal return in the 3-day period surrounding the 
proxy date. Furthermore, they find significant evidence that the board responded to a high 
negative vote by reducing executive pay in the following year.  
 The previous research on compensation related proposals, sponsored both by 
shareholders and management, has yielded mixed results for several reasons. First, 
shareholder sponsored proposals suffer from a self-selection bias. Each firm has its own 
shareholders, so research that attempts to determine what aspects of compensation make 
a firm more likely to be targeted by a proposal cannot control for the individual 
preferences of the shareholder sponsoring the proposal. My study examines votes in an 
environment that mandates say-on-pay votes which allows for a more robust and uniform 
sample. Second, previous studies have taken their samples from years with conflicting 
regulations surrounding compensation disclosure and voting rules. While they have 
attempted to control for the changing environment, my study benefits from consistent 
say-on-pay legislation. 
 Other prior research has attempted to glean shareholder support for compensation 
packages from director elections. Cai, Garner, and Walking (2009) find evidence that 
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high abnormal CEO compensation leads to significantly fewer votes for members of the 
compensation committee. However, there are numerous factors other than compensation 
that shareholders consider when electing directors, so my examination of say-on-pay 
votes, which are directly correlated to compensation, will give a clearer picture of what 
shareholders disapprove of in compensation packages.   
 More directly related to my research is the literature on say-on-pay in the United 
Kingdom where advisory votes have been mandatory since 2002. Balachandran, Ferri, 
and Maber (2007) examine the changes in CEO pay before and after the vote became 
mandatory. They find that instead of penalizing all CEOs, as some critics of the 
legislation argue, the legislation was effective in increasing the sensitivity of CEO 
compensation to negative operating performance, effectively reducing “rewards for 
failure”. In a thorough analysis of the value creation proposition of say-on-pay, Ferri and 
Maber (2011) analyze the market reaction in the U.K. to the announcement of say-on-pay 
legislation as well as the response of the board to high voting dissent. They find a 
positive market reaction to the legislation for firms with poor pay practices such as weak 
penalties for poor performance. In addition, they find that firms do indeed respond to 
high dissent by changing pay packages and removing controversial provisions. This is 
consistent with their hypothesis that U.K. investors focus on the composition of pay 
packages rather than simply how much CEOs are paid.   
In perhaps the most similar paper to mine, Carter and Zamora (2009) examine the 
determinants of voting outcomes in say-on-pay votes using a sample of U.K. firms from 
2002-2006. They find evidence that negative votes are positively correlated with higher 
salary, higher dilution, and a weak link between pay and performance measured by 
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annual bonus. In addition, similarly to Ferri and Maber (2011), they find evidence that 
boards react to high dissent. Specifically, they find that high negative votes lead to 
smaller increases in salary and dilution and an improved link between pay and 
performance. While a significant contribution to the literature, their study examines the 
relation between voting outcomes and only the three aspects of compensation mentioned 
above. My study extends the work done by Carter and Zamora (2009) to the United 
States as well as adds a number of other compensation variables and attempts to control 
for excess compensation by separating pay into predicted and residual. 
In simultaneous work, Kimbro and Xu (2013) examine factors determining say-
on-pay vote results in Russell 3000 companies through annual cross sectional regressions. 
Consistent with my results, they find that both poor performing firms and firms with high 
abnormal CEO compensation receive lower say-on-pay approval. In addition, they 
examine accounting quality and find that firms with high abnormal accruals receive lower 
say-on-pay approval. They do not examine dilution or the link between pay and 
performance. While using differing empirical techniques, our results are consistent, 
indicating the robustness of our conclusions.  
Several studies have examined the market reaction surrounding the passage of the 
Say-on-pay Bill by the House of Representatives on April 20, 2007. Cai and Walking 
(2011) find evidence that firms with high excess CEO compensation and weak 
governance have a significant positive share price reaction to the legislation. Although 
the passage of the bill was not a surprise, the market’s reaction could possibly be 
explained by the unexpected 2-1 margin by which it passed. Larcker, Ormazabal, and 
Taylor (2011) examine a large set of governance related legislative decisions including 
16 
 
the passage of the Say-on-pay Bill, and, using slightly different methodology, find no 
significant market reaction surrounding the date.  
 A recent paper by Beckerman (2012) tested for cumulative abnormal returns for 
the 103 firms receiving a failed say-on-pay vote in 2011 and the first half of 2012. He 
tested returns over event windows of two, four, and ten days surrounding the annual 
meeting date and found that the average cumulative abnormal return of the 103 firms that 
failed is not statistically different than zero in any of the event windows. His study 
indicates that as a group, there is no systematic market response on the date of a failed 
say-on-pay vote. However, it is likely that shareholder-unfriendly compensation packages 
are already priced in by the market before the vote occurs and no new information is 
provided by the vote itself. Future studies on this topic could examine individual firms 
that failed the vote to test for abnormal returns surrounding votes that would be 
considered a surprise by the market.  
 
5. Hypothesis and Empirical Methodology 
 To test which components of compensation shareholders vote against in their say-
on-pay votes, I specify the following panel OLS regression: 
 
                                                              (1) 
 
 where comp consists of my compensation variables of interest and performance and size 
are controls. Due to the multiple observations for each firm, the residuals are likely to 
suffer from autocorrelation. While still unbiased, this would result in inaccurate standard 
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errors. In order to reduce the effects of autocorrelation, I compute standard errors 
clustered by firm. 
 The first compensation component I examine is salary. Salaries are generally 
predetermined in the CEO’s employment contract and benchmarked against peer firms. 
Unlike other aspects of compensation, salaries are not sensitive to performance. 
Shareholders may disapprove of an executive receiving a large salary because it does 
nothing to motivate the CEO to work hard or align his interests with the shareholders. I 
expect shareholders to disapprove of high salaries and there to be a significant and 
negative relationship between the natural log of CEO salary and voting results. I expect 
this relationship to be especially pronounced when comparing salary relative to the 
industry mean, which could indicate a flawed peer group selection by the compensation 
committee.  
 The second component I analyze is the CEO’s annual cash bonus. Bonuses are 
generally determined on a yearly basis and tied to certain accounting measures 
determined by the compensation committee. Accounting for nearly 20% of total 
compensation, performance based cash bonuses are a significant part of CEO pay. Proxy 
rules distinguish between two types of cash bonuses in the Summary Compensation 
Table—“bonus” and “non-equity incentive plan compensation”. The latter is the award 
clearly outlined in the executive’s compensation plan and is directly tied to accounting 
and performance metrics. The former type of bonus, listed simply as “bonus” in the 
Summary Compensation Table, is a discretionary bonus that is not directly tied to any 
standards that had been previously communicated to the CEO. I attempt to see if 
shareholders disapprove of discretionary bonuses by creating a binary variable equal to 1 
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if the firm awarded its CEO with a discretionary bonus during the year. Discretionary 
bonuses are infrequently used in my sample with only 17% of CEO-years receiving a 
discretionary bonus and only accounting for around 3% of total compensation.  
 Cash bonuses are used to link pay with performance for a CEO. If shareholders 
observe a weak link between the two, I expect them to express their disapproval with a 
negative vote. To determine the pay-for-performance implicit in a CEO’s bonus, I follow 
methodology similar to that of Carter and Zamora (2006) and compute the difference 
between the CEO’s actual bonus and his predicted bonus: 
 
                                                 (2) 
 
Predicted bonus is determined for each CEO-year from a cross-sectional regression each 
year of bonus regressed on economic determinants of bonus and industry binomial 
variables:  
 
                            (3) 
 
where    consists of return on assets and shareholder return to control for performance, 
the natural log of revenue to control for size, the natural log of the CEO’s tenure, and 
industry controls.  
 To test the pay-for-performance link, I create two binary variables: one for the 
highest and one for the lowest quartile of difference between actual and predicted bonus. 
I expect shareholders to vote against the top quartile (weakest pay-for-performance link), 
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resulting in a significant and negative relationship between that binary variable and votes 
for say-on-pay.  
 Dilution stemming from stock option grants is the third component of pay I 
analyze. Option awards are granted as a form of risky long-term compensation designed 
to motivate CEO effort and align their interests with the shareholders. As previously 
discussed, past research has shown that shareholders disapprove of plans with high 
potential dilution. Dilution is measured by dividing the number of options granted by the 
total shares outstanding at the end of the year. The greater number of shares granted, the 
higher the potential dilution to shareholders. I expect shareholders to vote against plans 
with high dilution, resulting in a significant and negative relationship between dilution 
and vote results.  
In order to allow for the possibility that shareholders disapprove of compensation 
relative to the industry rather than strictly in absolute compensation levels, I adjust the 
following variables: adjusted salary is the log of CEO salary minus the mean for the 
industry, adjusted high and low bonus are determined in the same manner as before 
except each industry has its quartiles determined independently for each year, and finally 
adjusted dilution is measured as dilution less the mean for the industry. Industries are 
classified using the ten sectors of the Global Industry Classification Standard
6
. 
 In addition, I examine the impact of CEO golden parachute arrangements on the 
say-on-pay vote. A golden parachute, or change of control payment, is triggered when the 
CEO loses control of the company through a merger or other transaction. These types of 
packages are often considered “rewards for failure” because a poor performing CEO 
                                                          
6
The ten sectors are as follows: energy, materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, 
health care, financials, information technology, telecommunication services, and utilities. 
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could still be rewarded with handsome compensation in a merger. Golden parachutes are 
often very large contracts—in some cases they are valued in the hundreds of millions. 
While the SEC mandates a separate “say on golden parachute” vote when they ask 
shareholders to vote on a merger, it is possible that shareholders disapprove of excessive 
golden parachutes and factor that into their say-on-pay vote. While there are a number of 
aspects of a golden parachute that shareholders can disapprove of, such as single-trigger 
payments or providing tax gross-ups, I examine shareholders’ discontent of excess 
overall packages which includes cash severance, continuation of benefits, accelerated 
vesting of equity awards, and the executive’s retirement plan. I examine the  
shareholder reaction to an excess severance package by creating a binary variable equal 
to 1 if the CEO’s golden parachute payment is greater than 3 times his total compensation 
in that year. If shareholders disapprove of excess golden parachutes as a “reward for 
failure” and cannot wait for a specific vote to express their disapproval, I expect there to 
be a significant negative relationship between the binary variable indicating an excess 
parachute and the say-on-pay vote. 
 I also examine whether shareholders are “sensational” or “sophisticated” in their 
voting on pay packages in line with the work done by Emitur, Ferri, and Muslu (2010). I 
separate total pay into predicted and excess total pay, using a similar methodology as 
with bonus, as seen in Eq. (4) and Eq. (5): 
 
                                               (4) 
                         (5) 
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where    consists of the same controls used in Eq. (3) with the addition of the book-to-
market ratio to control for investment opportunities. In addition, I calculate the percent of 
excessive compensation by taking the difference between the natural log of the actual 
total and the natural log of predicted total as in Eq. (6): 
 
                                                    (6) 
 
 I expect shareholders to not react sensationally to high levels of deserved CEO 
pay and thus for there to be no significant relationship between predicted pay and vote 
results. Instead, I expect a significant negative relationship between excess pay as an 
indicator of shareholder sophistication.   
   
6. Data Description 
 CEO compensation data was collected from the ExecuComp database via the 
Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS) and supplemented with company proxy filings. 
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation data was collected from the 2011 and 2012 
Georgeson Annual Corporate Governance Reviews which included all firms that held 
their annual meetings in the first six months of the year. The remaining votes were hand 
collected from company filings
7
. All control data was collected from Compustat with 
missing values gathered from company filings. Return data was gathered from CRSP. 
Financial statements were obtained through the EDGAR database.  
                                                          
7
 All firms are required to publish an 8-K with the results of all proxy votes within four business days 
following the Annual Meeting 
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 The 2011 sample began with the 500 firms comprising the S&P 500 index at the 
end of the calendar year. Six of the firms held their 2011 annual meeting prior to the 
January 20 implementation of the say-on-pay requirement and 45 firms had CEO changes 
during the year. These were excluded from the sample leaving 449 firms in 2011. The 
2012 sample began with the 500 firms in the S&P 500 index at the end of 2012. Of these, 
38 did not hold a say-on-pay vote in 2012 because their shareholders elected to hold the 
vote either every two or every three years. Twenty seven firms had CEO changes mid-
year leaving 435 firms in the 2012 sample. Data from the two years were combined to 
give the total sample of 884 full CEO-years representing 495 distinct firms.  
 The say-on-pay vote result is calculated as the total number of votes “for” divided 
by the total number of votes cast, including abstentions. This is consistent with the 
methodology used by most firms when evaluating their voting results. The average result 
for say-on-pay votes held at the 2011 annual meeting was 88.5% ‘for’ with a range 
between 38.8% in the case of Stanley Black & Decker and 100%, obtained by several 
companies. The 2012 votes averaged slightly less at 87.9%, ranging from a low of 19.9% 
at Chesapeake Energy to 100% at the Washington Post Company.  
 There is a large range in the compensation data demonstrating the differing 
philosophies employed by compensation committees. Panel A of Table 1 shows the top 
ten highest earning CEO-years. At the low extreme of CEO compensation is Kosta 
Kartsotis, CEO of Fossil Inc. since October 2000, who has refused all forms of 
compensation since 2005. At the other end of the compensation spectrum is David 
Simon, CEO of Simon Property Group Inc. since 1998, whose total compensation 
amounted to $137.2 million in 2011. He received an annual salary of $1.2 million, a 
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performance bonus of $4 million, and a one-time retention grant with a fair value of close 
to $120 million. Not surprisingly, the firm’s shareholders voiced their disapproval 
through their say-on-pay vote with only 25.7% of votes approving the plan. Panel B of 
Table 1 shows the compensation of CEOs receiving the ten lowest say-on-pay results in 
the sample.  
 The control variables in the sample have a large range similar to that of the 
variables of interest. CEO tenure, calculated by subtracting the end of the corresponding 
fiscal year from the date the executive became the CEO divided by 365 days, ranges from 
1 year for CEOs who gained the title at the beginning of the year to 49 years in the case 
of Leslie Wexner, CEO of Limited Brands Inc since 1963. Firm size, measured by total 
revenue ranges from the smallest company Alexion Pharmaceuticals with $541 million in 
revenue in 2010 to Exxon Mobil with $486 billion in 2011. Return on assets, calculated 
by dividing net income by total assets, ranges from -27.3% by Dean Foods in 2011 to 
37.1% by Lorillard, Inc. in 2011. Finally, the annual shareholder return for the year 
correlated to the compensation is included as the final control. The return sample ranges 
from -66% for Alpha Natural Resources in 2011 to 219% for Netflix in 2010. 
 Table 2 provides statistics on the control variables: Panel A displays the range and 
Panel B provides a correlation matrix. Table 3 shows the medians for selected variables 
grouped by their voting result. In addition, it shows the results of a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
test indicating that there is a significant difference (p<0.01) in the distribution of salary, 
stock awards, option awards, other compensation, total compensation, golden parachutes, 
dilution, and tenure between firms receiving above and below 70% say-on-pay approval.   
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7. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 Table 4 reports the results of my analysis of the determinants of shareholder 
support for CEO compensation plans through their say-on-pay votes. Column (1) displays 
the relation between sop_result—the number of votes ‘for’ scaled by the total number of 
votes cast—and the five compensation components discussed previously (salary, weak 
pay-for-performance link, dilution, excess change of control payment, and high golden 
parachute) while controlling for size, performance, and firm fixed effects. There is a 
significant negative relationship between voting results and three of the compensation 
components: ln_salary and dilution (p<0.01) and hi_bonus (p<0.05). Although the results 
on ln_salary and hi_bonus are statistically significant, they are not economically 
significant. The results show that a fifty percent increase in salary from $1.1 million, the 
average salary in the sample, to $1.65 million results in only a roughly 1 percentage point 
decrease in say-on-pay results while holding the other variables constant. In addition, the 
existence of hi_bonus results in a decrease of 4.8 percentage points in vote results. The 
economic significance of dilution, however, is large: holding the other variables constant, 
an increase in dilution of one percentage point (note that the maximum dilution in the 
sample is just over 2%) results in a decrease in say-on-pay approval of roughly 27 
percentage points. The results indicate that shareholders disapprove of higher CEO 
salaries, higher dilution from stock options, and a poor link between bonus and 
performance resulting in a high bonus payout. Interestingly, the coefficient on lo_bonus 
is not significant, indicating that shareholders do not take into account a weak link 
between pay and performance when it results in a low bonus package. This result is 
interesting because it appears that shareholders do not disapprove of a CEO not being 
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properly rewarded in cash for good performance. In addition, Column (1) analyzes the 
impact of a discretionary bonus and a high golden parachute agreement in the 
compensation package. The results show that there is no significant relationship between 
discrectionary_binary and the voting result. While this is contrary to the assumption that 
shareholders disapprove of discretionary bonuses because they are not tied to any specific 
performance criteria, it is possible that there are too few firms awarding discretionary 
bonuses and they are generally low in value so the results aren’t significant. Similarly, 
there is no significance shown on the coefficient on hi_golden. This is not surprising 
given the SEC rule of a mandatory vote on golden parachutes specifically in a proposed 
merger or other transaction requiring approval. It is an indication that shareholders vote 
with sophistication and do not vote emotionally on high severance agreements. 
 One possible concern with the interpretation of Column (1) is that the control 
variables roa and ln_revt are also included in the cross sectional regressions used to 
determine hi_bonus and lo_bonus in Eq. (3). Therefore, it is possible that when included 
in Column (1), the correlation between those variables could present a problem of 
multicollinearity. To alleviate this potential concern, Column (2) shows that the 
inferences in Column (1) are robust to removing the control variables roa and ln_revt. 
While the explanatory power of the model is slightly reduced, the coefficients and the 
significance of the variables of interest remain largely unchanged.  
 Column (3) displays similar results when examining industry adjusted 
compensation figures. After adjusting ln_salary to be equal to the natural log of the firm 
minus the mean for the industry, there is still a significant negative relationship (p<0.01) 
between it and say-on-pay results. Similarly, the coefficient on adjdilution and hi_bonus 
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are still significant and negative (p<0.01 and p<0.05, respectively). The economic 
significance of the coefficients is similar to what it was before adjusting for industry. 
Column (4) shows that the results in Column (3) are robust to removing the control 
variables for the same reason as explained above in regards to Column (2). The results in 
Column (1) and Column (3) suggest that shareholders vote against higher salaries, 
dilutive stock option awards, and CEO receiving bonuses that are greater than what they 
deserve based on performance both relative to the entire sample and to the industry.  
 Table 5 examines shareholders’ response to high excess pay versus high predicted 
pay in an attempt to determine if shareholders vote sensationally or with sophistication. 
Column (1) shows a significant negative relationship (p<0.01) between excess_total and 
sop_result and no significance on predicted_total indicating that shareholders are 
sophisticated and make adjustments for an expected level of pay instead of reacting 
sensationally to high levels of pay that can be justified by performance. The results 
indicate that while holding predicted total compensation constant, an increase of ten 
million dollars of excess compensation results in a decrease of nearly 7 percentage points 
in the firm’s say-on-pay vote.  
 Column (2) explores the impact of the percentage of excess pay. The results show 
a significant (p<0.01) and negative correlation between both excess total and percent 
excess total. The significance of percent_excess indicates that shareholders find not only 
the level of excess compensation to be significant, but also the degree by which it differs 
from actual compensation. The effect is economically significant as well: holding the 
level of excess total constant, an increase in its relative size by ten percentage points 
leads to a decrease of 24 percentage points in the voting result. To illustrate, take an 
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example from the sample. The CEOs of Autodesk and Pfizer both made about $9.3 
million in excess compensation in 2011; however, given the differences in dollar amounts 
of actual compensation, this corresponds to 92% excess for the Autodesk CEO and only 
45% for Pfizer’s. Not surprisingly, Autodesk received only 53.6% say-on-pay approval 
while Pfizer received 95.8% approval. The results in Column (2) indicate that 
shareholders are sophisticated enough to recognize this difference and to penalize CEOs 
that receive a high percentage of excess compensation with a negative vote. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 In an empirical analysis of the first two years of say-on-pay regulation in the 
United States, this paper finds that shareholders vote against CEO compensation plans 
with high salary, poor link between pay and performance, high dilution, and high excess 
CEO compensation. This paper finds evidence of a high level of shareholder 
sophistication in evaluating CEO compensation packages such that shareholders are 
effectively voting against plans with poor links between compensation and performance 
as well as a high percentage of excess compensation. The results demonstrate the 
importance of say-on-pay in the United States and contribute to the evidence that 
shareholders use the tool responsibly and do not punish well performing CEOs.  
 These results are especially important to corporate boards that now have empirical 
evidence as to what elements of compensation packages are the most disturbing to 
shareholders. Armed with this data, they will be better able to design compensation 
packages without the potential distraction and bad signal of a negative say-on-pay result. 
This paper contributes to the literature on executive compensation and shareholder votes 
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in the United States as the first paper to empirically examine the determinants of 
shareholder support in the first two years of say-on-pay, and paves the way for future 
research on how corporate boards respond to negative votes.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 
Panel A: Highest paid CEOs by total as reported in the Summary Compensation Table 
Company Year 
CEO Last 
Name 
Salary Bonus Stock Awards 
Option 
Awards 
Non-Equity 
Incentive 
Pension 
Change 
Other 
Compensation 
Total 
SOP 
Result 
SPG 2012 Simon   1,211,538      4,000,000    131,939,768              -                        -                       - 15,239   137,166,545  25.7% 
ORCL 2012 Ellison                 1  -                             -                 90,693,400  3,918,633 - 1,548,632     96,160,696  40.9% 
VIAB 2011 Dauman   2,625,000              -              41,833,309      28,620,000  11,250,000 45,793 141,206     84,515,308  86.5% 
ORCL 2011 Ellison                 1                   -                 -                62,668,200  13,341,994 - 1,549,625     77,559,820  66.4% 
OXY 2011 Irani   1,191,667      1,400,000      40,250,000               -           31,575,000 - 1,690,343     76,107,010  90.3% 
CBS 2011 Moonves   3,513,462    27,500,000        7,999,982      14,868,000  - 869,854 2,977,722     57,729,020  86.8% 
ANF 2012 Jeffries   1,500,000                   -                  -               43,201,893  1,188,000 1,460,398 719,182     48,069,473  23.6% 
MCK 2011 Hammergren   1,664,615                    -        12,185,796        7,370,750  9,860,400 14,072,640 511,951     45,666,152  69.7% 
DISCA 2011 Zaslav   2,000,000                     -       20,333,632      15,412,996  4,410,000 - 432,668     42,589,296  81.3% 
MCK 2012 Hammergren   1,680,000  -       8,601,530        6,133,206  12,827,520 10,075,558 362,508     39,680,322  62.0% 
Panel B: CEOs receiving the lowest say-on-pay vote results  
Company Year 
CEO Last 
Name 
Salary Bonus Stock Awards 
Option 
Awards 
Non-Equity 
Incentive 
Pension 
Change 
Other 
Compensation 
Total 
SOP 
Result 
CHK 2012 McClendon  975,000   1,951,000   13,627,556   -     -    - 1,314,520  17,868,076  19.9% 
ANF 2012 Jeffries  1,500,000   -     -     43,201,893   1,188,000  1,460,398 719,182  48,069,473  23.6% 
NBR 2012 Isenberg  1,250,000   15,595,000   -     -     -    35,502 2,616,363  19,496,865  25.0% 
SPG 2012 Simon  1,211,538   4,000,000   131,939,768   -     -    - 15,239  137,166,545  25.7% 
CBE 2012 Hachigian  1,266,667   -     10,078,354   4,822,121   3,800,000  11,994 1,149,536  21,128,672  28.9% 
BIG 2012 Fishman  1,400,000   -     10,280,000   -     -    - 244,662  11,924,662  31.2% 
PBI 2012 Martin  975,000   -     1,187,500   1,187,500   4,463,160  1,354,880 62,758  9,230,798  34.8% 
BBY 2012 Dunn  1,121,154   -     3,632,679   2,265,594   -    - 55,532  7,074,959  38.2% 
SWK 2011 Lundgren  1,208,433   -     25,347,725   1,255,500   4,342,800  159,663 416,138  32,730,259  38.8% 
ORCL 2012 Ellison  1   -     -     90,693,400   3,918,663  - 1,548,632  96,160,696  40.9% 
Panel A lists the ten CEOs with the greatest total compensation as reported to the SEC in the Summary Compensation Table.  
Panel B lists the CEOs of firms receiving the ten lowest results in their say-on-pay votes.  
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Table 2 
Panel A: Range of control variables 
 
Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Return on Assets 6.79% 6.01% -27.38% 37.10% 
Total Revenue $19,491 $38,813 $540 $486,429 
CEO Tenure 7.56 6.20 1 49.03 
Book-to-Market 0.515 0.423 -0.630 5.144 
Stock Return 14.59% 28.78% -65.97% 218.93% 
Panel B: Correlation matrix of control variables 
 
Return on Assets Total Revenue CEO Tenure Book-to-Market Stock Return 
Return on Assets 1.0000 
  
  
Total Revenue -0.0128 1.0000 
 
  
CEO Tenure 0.0464 -0.0487 1.0000   
Book-to-Market -0.3568 0.0746 -0.0556 1.0000  
Stock Return 0.2303 -0.0421 0.0611 -0.2794 1.0000 
The above tables provide summary statistics on key control variables. Return on Assets is calculated by 
dividing net income by average total assets. Total revenue is reported in thousands of dollars. CEO tenure 
is the number of years the CEO has held the position. Book-to-Market is calculated by dividing the book 
value of the firm by its market value at the end of its fiscal year. Stock returns are the 12-month total 
shareholder return for the fiscal year.  
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Table 3 
Medians of selected variables grouped by vote result 
 
All Votes High Votes 
Medium 
Votes 
Failing 
Votes 
Wilcoxon 
z-score 
Salary 1,020,400 1,003,846 1,137,702 1,210,000 3.122*** 
Bonus 0 0 0 0 1.859* 
Stock Awards 3,171,823 3,077,778 4,971,604 3,632,679 4.557*** 
Option Awards 1,642,105 1,587,495 2,976,323 2,265,594 4.295*** 
Non-Equity 
Incentive 
1,746,889 1,746,777 2,050,000 857,290 0.672 
Pension Change 134,205 130,600 630,830 11,994 1.726* 
Other Comp 151,554 143,277 264,732 416,138 3.752*** 
Total 9,785,822 9,474,954 13,838,679 16,369,535 7.057*** 
Golden Parachute 20,380,666 20,091,855 25,728,696 43,297,320 2.993*** 
CEO Tenure 6 6 4 7 2.576*** 
Option Dilution 0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.08% 2.428** 
Stock Return 13.7% 15.0% -0.7% -6.1% -4.972*** 
N 884 789 76 19  
This table presents the median of selected compensation and control variables according to the voting 
outcome defined as follows: All Votes is all votes in the sample, High Votes are votes above 70% ‘for’, 
Medium Votes are votes between 50% and 70% ‘for’, and Failing Votes are votes receiving less than 50% 
‘for’. The farthest right column presents the z-score for a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test between high 
votes and all other votes (medium and failing) for each variable of interest. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Compensation data is as reported in the Summary 
Compensation Table in each firm’s annual Proxy Statement. CEO Tenure is defined as the number of years 
the CEO has held his current position. Option Dilution is the number of stock options granted to the CEO 
in the year scaled by total shares outstanding at the end of the year. Stock return is the annual stock return 
of the firm in the year of the compensation.  
  
34 
 
Table 4 
Regression results of percentage votes for say-on-pay on compensation data and controls 
 Say-on-pay Result   
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln_salary -0.0276*** -0.0266***   
 (0.0049) (0.005)   
hi_bonus -0.0482** -0.0522**   
 (0.0216) (0.0213)   
lo_bonus 0.0402 0.0405   
 (0.0251) (0.026)   
dilution -27.160*** -26.29***   
 (5.671) (5.371)   
discretionary_binary 0.0163 0.0210   
 (0.0265) (0.0258)   
hi_golden -0.0134 -0.0093   
 (0.0214) (0.0214)   
adjln_salary   -0.0248*** -0.0237*** 
   (0.0056) (0.0057) 
adjdilution   -23.04*** -22.35*** 
   (5.579) (5.566) 
adjhi_bonus   -0.0414** -0.0443** 
   (0.0209) (0.0207) 
adjlo_bonus   0.0370 0.0415 
   (0.0250) (0.0267) 
roa 0.450**  0.443*  
 (0.225)  (0.227)  
ln_revt -0.0258  -0.0236  
 (0.0436)  (0.0444)  
Constant 1.294*** 1.080*** 1.066*** 0.881*** 
 (0.398) (0.0374) (0.402) (0.0088) 
     
R-squared 0.083 0.069 0.073 0.060 
Number of clusters 495 495 495  
The sample consists of 884 say-on-pay vote results regressed on CEO-year compensation observations 
from fiscal year 2010 and 2011. The columns present panel regressions where the dependent variable is the 
percentage votes “for” the advisory vote on executive compensation scaled by the total number of votes 
cast including abstentions. The independent variables are the natural log of CEO salary (ln_salary), binary 
variables indicating the CEO’s bonus is in the highest or lowest quartile of actual bonus less expected 
bonus (hi_bonus and lo_bonus, respectively), the level of dilution resulting from CEO stock option awards 
measured as options granted scaled by shares outstanding (dilution), a binary variable if the CEO received a 
discretionary bonus (discretionary_binary), natural log of salary less the mean for the industry 
(adjln_salary), the same binary variables indicating high or low excess bonus but adjusted for the industry 
mean (adjhi_bonus and adjlo_bonus, respectively), return on assets measured as net income scaled by total 
assets (roa), and the natural log of total revenue (ln_revt). Compensation amounts are in thousands of 
dollars. Firm fixed effects are included in each regression, but not shown. T-statistics are presented in 
parenthesis below coefficients and calculated based on clustering by firm (495 clusters). ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.  
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Table 5 
Regression results of percentage votes for say-on-pay on the breakdown of total compensation 
 Say-on-pay Result 
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
predicted_total -0.00148  
 (0.00270)  
excess_total -0.00693*** -0.00578*** 
 (0.000816) (0.000801) 
percent_excess  -0.0244*** 
  (0.00478) 
Constant 0.914*** 0.897*** 
 (0.0252) (0.00219) 
   
R-squared 0.132 0.151 
Number of clusters 495 495 
This table presents results of panel regressions where the dependent variable is the percentage votes “for” 
the advisory vote on executive compensation scaled by the total number of votes cast including abstentions. 
The independent variables are the predicted total CEO compensation (predicted_total) which is determined 
through annual cross sectional regressions with total compensation as the dependent variable and economic 
determinants of pay as the independent variables as described in Eq. (5). Excess compensation 
(excess_total) is calculated as the difference between actual total compensation as reported in the Summary 
Compensation Table and predicted total as described in Eq. (4). Predicted total and excess total are in 
millions of dollars. Percent excess total compensation (percent_excess) is calculated as the difference in the 
natural logs of total and predicted as described in Eq. (6). Firm fixed effects are included in each 
regression, but not shown. T-statistics are presented in parenthesis below coefficients and calculated based 
on clustering by firm (495 clusters). ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, 
respectively.  
 
